Cooperative advertising programs: are accrual constraints necessary? by Punya, Chattergee et al.
Cooperative advertising programs: Are accrual constraints necessary?
Punya Chatterjee
Pennsylvania State University
Old Main, State College, PA 16801, USA.
Email: pxc85@psu.edu.
Salma Karray1
University of Ontario Institute of Technology,









This paper investigates how the use of an accrual constraint in a cooperative ad-
vertising program affects channel members’ profits in a bilateral monopoly, as well as
their pricing and advertising decisions. The main findings indicate that, compared to
unconstrained cooperative advertising programs, when an accrual constraint is used
and the manufacturer’s contribution to the retailer’s advertising costs exceeds the
accrued cooperative advertising budget, the retailer reduces both her retail price and
advertising efforts to the level where cooperative advertising is not offered; while the
manufacturer also reduces his wholesale price and advertising efforts, but this time,
the wholesale price remains higher than when there is no cooperative advertising.
These strategic moves translate to less (more) profits for the manufacturer (retailer).
The use of an accrual constraint is counterproductive for the manufacturer as the
retailer uses the accrued advertising fund as a side payment rather than a direct
incentive to invest more in advertising. The manufacturer and retailer are better off
when unconstrained cooperative advertising programs are supplemented with other
incentives, including side payments and advertising support services.
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1 Introduction
Cooperative advertising programs between manufacturers and retailers are financial
arrangements in which manufacturers commit to pay part or full costs of advertis-
ing undertaken by retailers to promote locally the manufacturers’ products. These
programs are generally developed for various reasons, including providing additional
incentives to retailers to promote the manufacturers’ products, stimulating immedi-
ate sales, and increasing the effectiveness of manufacturers’ promotional activities,
which may include advertising programs at the national or regional levels. Recent
reports indicate that American businesses offered about $36 billion in cooperative
advertising money to their vendors in 2015, which represents 12% of their total ad-
vertising costs (Borrell Associates Report 2015).
As observed by Dutta et al. (1995), cooperative advertising arrangements gener-
ally contain two major components: a participation rate that specifies the percentage
of retail advertising that a manufacturer is committed to pay and an accrual rate
that specifies the maximum manufacturer’s contribution to the cooperative advertis-
ing program as a percentage of the retailer’s purchases from the manufacturer. Both
the accrual and participation rates are equally important in a cooperative advertis-
ing arrangement. The first is linked to purchases and communicates the maximum
amount a manufacturer allocates to a retailer’s local advertising expenses. The sec-
ond indicates how the costs between the two partners will be shared. The marketing
firm MultiAd, described as "the largest co-op database ever accumulated", indicates
both accrual and participation rates as important elements of the cooperative adver-
tising agreement (MultiAd website 2015).
There is an extensive literature in supply chain and marketing channels that
investigates the optimal design of cooperative advertising arrangements in various
channel structures and contexts. Two comprehensive reviews of this literature have
recently been conducted by Aust and Buscher (2014) and Jørgensen and Zaccour
2
(2014). These reviews summarize the key findings on the design and use of partic-
ipation rates in cooperative advertising programs and their various impacts. The
main results from this literature suggest that, in the context of a bilateral monopoly,
these programs are effective in boosting retail advertising, expanding demand, and
ultimately increasing profits for each channel member (e.g., Dant and Berger 1996;
Jørgensen et al. 2000; Huang and Li 2001; Yue et al. 2006; Karray and Zaccour 2006;
Xie and Ai 2006; Yan 2010; Kunter 2012; Yang et al. 2013; Karray 2013; Zhang et
al. 2013).
A few studies have expanded these results to the case where some competition
arises in the channel. In particular, Bergen and John (1997) used a consumer-based
model and showed that cooperative advertising programs can benefit a single man-
ufacturer selling through multiple retailers. Karray and Zaccour (2007) found that
cooperative advertising can lead to a prisoner’s dilemma situation for manufactur-
ers when competition arises at both levels of the channel. Other researchers have
recently showed that these programs are not always effective for competing retailers
(Chutani and Sethi 2012; Karray and Amin 2015; Liu et al. 2014; Karray 2015).
In particular, cooperative advertising may not benefit competing retailers because it
can increase prices, thereby cancelling out its demand-stimulating effects.
These developments in the literature show the following three important points.
First, it is important to endogenize prices in cooperative advertising models. Second,
competitive interactions in the channel significantly affect cooperative advertising
effectiveness. Third, despite the large number of analytical studies about cooperative
advertising, the literature has overlooked the fact that a very large number of such
programs offered by manufacturers specify an accrual constraint in addition to a
participation rate.
Explicitly or implicitly, the existing literature about cooperative advertising as-
sumes that manufacturers offer unlimited cooperative advertising support to their
retailers, i.e., no matter how much the retailer’s advertising expenses amount to, the
manufacturer commits to sharing all of these expenses according to the agreed par-
ticipation rate. Alternatively, the dismissal of accrual rates in the existing literature
could mean that even when manufacturers set a budget to limit their cooperative
advertising support to retailers, the retailer’s advertising expenditures do exceed the
maximum amount that the manufacturer is willing to reimburse. While such uncon-
strained cooperative advertising programs exist in the marketplace, there are many
others in which manufacturers use accrual rates as a way to control their budget al-
locations to cooperative advertising activities. This is shown in the empirical study
by Dutta et al. (1995) who found that 2,156 cooperative advertising programs in
various industries offer both the participation and accrual rates. Numerous more
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recent examples can be found in the Co-op Advertising Programs Sourcebook, a
compiled database of cooperative advertising programs offered by manufacturers in
different industries. For instance, in the sporting goods industry, the manufacturer
Yonex Corporation offers its retailers a 50 percent participation rate and a 5 percent
accrual rate, while Nike offers 100% participation rate and only 0.5 percent accrual
rate.2 This shows that many manufacturers include information about the accrual
rate along with the cooperative advertising rates in their communications to the
retailers.
To the best of our knowledge, the paper by Zhang et al. (2015) is the first attempt
that formally investigates the use of an accrual rate in a bilateral monopoly supply
chain. In a dynamic setup in which pricing decisions are exogenous, the authors
consider that the manufacturer sets national advertising effort and a cooperative
advertising participation rate and the retailer determines local advertising effort,
taking the accrual rate as given. The main results indicate that some of the previous
findings in the cooperative advertising literature may not generalize to programs that
have accrual constraints. As an example, while it is known that without an accrual
constraint retailers always increase their advertising efforts as the participation rate
increases, Zhang et al. (2015) find that when an accrual constraint is added, the
participation rate could have the opposite effect on the retailer’s advertising. They
also find that the accrual constraint reduces both the manufacturer’s and retailer’s
advertising levels and impacts negatively on the two channel partners’ profits. Such
a dramatic change on what we know about some elements of cooperative advertising
programs calls for additional research on the impact of the accrual constraint on
channel members’ strategies and profits.
Contrary to Zhang et al.’s work, in addition to their advertising decisions, the
current research allows both the manufacturer and retailer to endogenously set their
respective prices. The goal of this research is therefore to investigate the impact
of the use of an accrual constraint on channel members’ profits and pricing and
advertising decisions. We hope our research will provide useful practical guidelines
to marketing managers and contribute to expanding our current limited knowledge
about the use of accrual rates in cooperative advertising programs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
model and discusses its assumptions. Section 3 derives the equilibrium solutions for
three games, namely the game without cooperative advertising and the cooperative
advertising games with and without an accrual constraint. Section 4 assesses the
impact of the accrual constraint on channel members’ optimal strategies and profits.





Consider a bilateral monopoly in which a manufacturer sells its product to a single
retailer who then sells this product to consumers. Let w and p denote, respectively,
the wholesale price set by the manufacturer and the retail price set by the retailer.
Also, let em and er denote the manufacturer’s and retailer’s advertising efforts for
the product. In addition to setting his pricing and advertising decisions, the manu-
facturer also commits to stimulate retail advertising. The goal is to give additional
incentives to the retailer to advertise more and secure better profits. As a conse-
quence, in addition to advertising for his product, the manufacturer offers to share
part of the retailer’s advertising expenses at a given rate, η (coop participation rate),
to a maximum of percentage, r (accrual rate), of the retailer’s purchases.
We assume the following linear demand function:
d = A+ bem + ger − p
The parameter A is positive and represents the baseline demand for the product.
The parameters b and g respectively denote the effects of manufacturer and retailer
advertising. This work relies on several assumptions. We discuss some of them in the
following lines. The parameter A serves as a scale and its value does not significantly
change the qualitative results in this paper. The effects of retail price on the demand
is normalized to 1. Because retail prices are generally known to have greater effects
on demand than advertising, we assume that the effects of both manufacturer and
retailer advertising (b and g) lie between 0 and 1. We consider that the accrual
rate (r) is exogenous to the model to focus on its impacts on channel members’
strategies and profits. While this assumption may seem restrictive, it can be justified
by the observation that manufacturers often set their accrual rates and keep them
unchanged for very long periods that can go over several years (see examples in the
Co-op Advertising Programs Sourcebook). Also, the accrual rate is more influenced
by financial than marketing considerations. It is generally set to limit advertising
expenditures rather than to pursue any identified market opportunity. On the other
hand, manufacturers can adjust their pricing and other advertising decisions on a
regular basis. Retailers also have the possibility to react to any changes in the
manufacturers’ pricing and advertising decisions.
We assume that the retailer does not stockpile, i.e., the quantity of product
purchased from the manufacturer is identical to the quantity sold to consumers.
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This assumption ensures that the manufacturer’s cooperative advertising program
aligns the interests of the manufacturer with those of the retailer. Everything else
being equal, the manufacturer sets a cooperative advertising budget that depends on
the sales of his product.
Advertising costs for the manufacturer and retailer are convex and given respec-
tively by C(em) = e2m and C(er) = e
2
r . Convex advertising costs are common in the
marketing literature (Aust and Buscher 2014). They imply that marginal costs of
advertising are increasing. When the manufacturer offers an unconstrained cooper-
ative advertising program with a participation rate η to the retailer (η ∈ (0, 1)), the
manufacturer’s portion of the retailer’s advertising expenses on her product is ηe2r ,
while the retailer’s effective advertising cost is (1 − η)e2r . Alternatively, when the
manufacturer offers a constrained cooperative advertising program with a participa-
tion rate η, and an accrual rate r, the manufacturer’s constrained contribution to






In this case, the manufacturer pays a percentage of the retailer’s advertising
expenses ηe2r as in the unconstrained cooperative advertising program to a maximum
amount of rwd, which is the accumulated accrued advertising budget, also known as
available cooperative advertising funds. In any case, the manufacturer and retailer
determine their respective advertising and pricing decisions so as to maximize their
own profits. The manufacturer’s profit function, Πm, and the retailer’s profit, Πr,
are respectively given by:
max
w,em,η
Πm = wd− e
2
m − CR and max
p,er
Πr = (p−w)d− e
2
r + CR,
where CR = min (rwd, ηe2r) .
3 Equilibrium solutions
We use the Stackelberg solution concept to derive equilibria. The manufacturer is
the channel leader, while the retailer is the follower. We first analyze the status quo
scenario in which the manufacturer offers no cooperative advertising to the retailer.
We follow with the analysis of the second scenario in which the manufacturer offers an
unconstrained cooperative advertising program. This is the most studied scenario in
the literature: there is no accrual constraint and the manufacturer reimburses the re-
tailer for advertising spending as per the cooperative advertising rate. We finish with
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the analysis of the scenario where the manufacturer offers a cooperative advertising
support subject to an accrual constraint. In each scenario, the manufacturer first
announces his wholesale price, participation rate, and advertising effort. Knowing
these announcements, the retailer sets his retail price and advertising effort.
To obtain subgame-perfect equilibria, we derive the optimal solutions backwards.
The retailer’s problem is solved first and the resolution of the manufacturer’s problem
comes last. Recall that the manufacturer’s accrual rate (r) is exogenous and is set
before the start of the game. It is therefore treated as a parameter in our model
rather than a decision variable.
We define the accrual constraint for the manufacturer (AC) as:
AC = rwd− ηe2r .
If the accrual constraint is not activated or satisfied (i.e., AC ≥ 0), the retailer’s
share of the advertising costs for the manufacturer’s product is lower than or equal
to the accrued cooperative advertising funds. In this case, the games with and
without accrual constraint give the same solution at the equilibrium. Conversely, If
the accrual constraint is activated or not satisfied (i.e., AC < 0), the retailer’s share
of the advertising costs exceeds the accrued cooperative advertising funds, and the
two games lead to different strategies at equilibrium.
For each problem, we need to verify the following conditions at the equilibrium:
retailer’s pricing, advertising effort, and profits are positive and the retail price is
higher than the wholesale price to guarantee positive retail margins. We also verify
that the manufacturer’s wholesale price, participation rate, and advertising effort are
positive. Finally, demands are positive and second-order conditions for all problems
are verified. The proof for these conditions is included in Appendices A, B, and C.
4 No cooperative advertising
In this case, the manufacturer does not offer a cooperative advertising program to
the retailer, i.e., CR = η = 0. The equilibrium pricing and advertising decisions are
denoted by the superscript NCA (No Cooperative Advertising) and are summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 For the case where cooperative advertising is not offered in the chan-
nel, the equilibrium pricing and advertising decisions and profits for the manufacturer
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and retailer are given by:
wNCA =
A (g2 − 4)
b2 + 2g2 − 8
,
pNCA =
3A (g2 − 6)
















(b2 + 2g2 − 8)2
.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Given the model’s assumptions and parameters’ ranges, the player’s strategies
and profits in Proposition 1 are positive. Therefore there is no additional restriction
to impose on the model parameters to ensure positive strategies and non-negative
profits.
4.1 Cooperative advertising without accrual constraint
The derivation of the players’ optimal strategies when the manufacturer offers an
unconstrained cooperative advertising program is described in Appendix B. The
equilibrium pricing and advertising decisions are denoted by the superscript NC
(No Constraint) and are summarized in Proposition 2 below.
Proposition 2 For the case where cooperative advertising is offered without an ac-
crual constraint or when the accrual constraint is not active (i.e., rwd − ηe2r ≥ 0),
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the equilibrium strategies and profits for the two channel members are as follows:
wNC =
A (3g2 − 16)
4b2 + 9g2 − 32
,
pNC =
3A (g2 − 8)

















(4b2 + 9g2 − 32)2
.
Proof. See Appendix B.
As expected, the findings in Proposition 2 indicate that the two players’ strategies
and profits are positive and do not depend on the accrual rate when the cooperative
advertising accrued budget is not restrictive. They are influenced by all the other
three parameters, including the baseline demand (A), and the effects of both the
retailer and manufacturer advertising (g and b). Given the model’s assumptions and
parameters’ ranges, these equilibrium strategies and outcomes are positive.
4.2 Cooperative advertising with accrual constraint
This subsection deals with scenarios where the manufacturer’s supported share of
retailer’s advertising expenditures is greater than the accrued advertising budget,
i.e., min (rwd, ηie
2
r) = rwd. The equilibrium pricing and advertising decisions are
denoted by the superscript C (Constraint) and are summarized in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 For the case where cooperative advertising is offered with an accrual
constraint or when the accrual constraint is activated (i.e., rwd − ηe2r < 0), the




A (g2 − 4)
(b2 + 2g2 − 8) (1− r)
,
pC =
3A (g2 − 6)
















(b2 + 2g2 − 8)2
.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The findings in Proposition 3 indicate that all strategies and profits are positive
given the model’s assumptions and parameters’ ranges. The wholesale price increases
as the accrual rate increases at the equilibrium. On the other hand, all other chan-
nel decisions and profits are not directly affected by the accrual rate. Because the
manufacturer’s budget allocation to cooperative advertising depends on their sales
to the retailer, any increase of the accrual rate reduces their optimal profits if the
wholesale price is kept constant. To ensure that the manufacturer’s profit remains
unchanged when the accrual rate goes up, it is logical to increase the wholesale price.
Manufacturers may therefore choose to offer generous cooperative advertising funds
to retailers by setting wholesale prices that allow them to achieve better profitability.
5 Effects of the accrual constraint on strategies
and profits
In the following three subsections, we compare the findings in Propositions 1-3 to
assess the effects of the accrual constraint on equilibrium strategies and profits of the
manufacturer and retailer. Recall that we respectively denote by NCA, NC, and
C the game with no cooperative advertising, the game with cooperative advertising
without accrual constraint, and the game with cooperative advertising and accrual
constraint. Therefore the superscripts NCA, NC, and C are used to indicate the
strategies and profits of the corresponding game.
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5.1 Effects of the accrual constraint on advertising
Comparisons of the players’ advertising obtained in the three games lead to the
findings summarized in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 When the accrual constraint is activated or not satisfied (i.e., AC <











Proof. Straightforward from comparisons of the advertising strategies obtained in
Propositions 1, 2, and 3.
Proposition 4 supports the view that regardless of the value of the accrual rate,
the manufacturer and retailer reduce their advertising investments when the accrual
constraint is activated to the level where cooperative advertising is not offered. The
retailer’s decision to reduce advertising investments due to the limited support from
the manufacturer is expected. Unfortunately, the saving that the manufacturer re-
alizes in setting a suboptimal cooperative advertising program does not translate
to more manufacturer advertising. Zhang et al. (2015) also obtained a similar re-
sult, which can be better understood by further analyzing the effects of the accrual
constraint on prices.
5.2 Effects of the accrual constraint on prices
Comparisons of the players’ prices for the games with and without the accrual con-
straint for the values of the parameters for which these two games are feasible and
the accrual constraint is activated are summarized in Proposition 5 below.
Proposition 5 When the accrual constraint is activated (or not satisfied), the com-
parisons of the equilibrium prices for the three games give the following results:
wNC > wC > wNCA,
pNC > pC = pNCA.
Proof. Straightforward from comparisons of the pricing strategies obtained in Propo-
sitions 1, 2, and 3.
The findings in Proposition 5 indicate that when the retailer’s accrued cooperative
advertising budget is not enough to support the retailer’s advertising expenses as
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in the game without accrual constraint, channel members revert to price cuts to
lessen the effects of suboptimal investments in cooperative advertising. Everything
else being equals, a lower wholesale price for the manufacturer means a reduced
margin that prevents him from reaching the optimal level of investment in his own
advertising, as shown in Proposition 4. For the manufacturer, however, the price in
the C game is still higher than the price in the NCA game in which a cooperative
advertising program is not offered. The observed wholesale price increase in the C
game, compared to the NCA game, helps the manufacturer to recoup the funds
committed to support retailer advertising. In addition, the retail price is the same in
both the C and NCA games. This is due to the fact that the manufacturer recoups
the lump sum payment given as advertising support to the retailer via an increased
wholesale price. As found in Proposition 4, the implication of this strategy is that
the retailer maintains the same level of advertising in the C andNCA games because
the accrued cooperative advertising budget in the C game does not provide her with
the necessary leverage to invest more in advertising the manufacturer’s product.
5.3 Effects of the accrual constraint on profits
The comparisons of the players’ profits in the three games are summarized in Propo-
sition 6 below.
Proposition 6 When the accrual constraint is activated (or not satisfied), the profits











Proof. Straightforward from comparisons of profits obtained in Propositions 1, 2,
and 3.
The manufacturer earns the same profit in both the C and NCA games, which
is lower than the profit earned in the NC game where a cooperative advertising
program is offered without an accrual constraint. The retailer also earns the same
profits in both the C and NCA games, but this time, this profit is higher than what
she obtains in the NC game. Thus, when the accrual constraint is activated, except
for the wholesale prices, the strategies and profits of the two players are identical
to those of the game without a cooperative advertising program. In addition to the
fact that cooperative advertising funds received in a constrained program are not
enough to pay for additional advertising expenses generated by such a program that
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the retailer would not normally support in an NCA game, the manufacturer also
sets an arbitrary cooperative advertising budget limit that is not directly related to
the level of retailer advertising. As a matter of fact, channel members focus their
advertising efforts on the availability of funds rather than on taking advantage of
growth opportunities that might be created by higher advertising. This conservative
approach leads basically to the status quo.
On the other hand, the preferences of the two players with respect to cooper-
ative advertising programs with or without accrual constraint differ. A restrictive
accrual constraint reduces (increases) the manufacturer’s (retailer’s) profits. Con-
versely, Zhang et al. (2015) found that the accrual constraint reduces both the
manufacturer’s and retailer’s profits. The result for the retailer may seem counter-
intuitive in the sense that higher advertising investments in the NC game lead to
a larger demand and can also lead to higher total channel profits compared to the
C game. With an accrual constraint, the retailer does not effectively participate
to the manufacturer’s cooperative advertising program as she maintains her status
quo pricing and advertising strategies that keep the demand unchanged. This can
be explained by the fact that the designed cooperative advertising is not attractive
enough for the retailer at the status quo (ΠNCr < Π
NCA
r ) unless the manufacturer
accepts to provide additional incentives to the retailer to increase her revenue or
further reduce her advertising costs. The supply of additional incentives is possible
not only because the manufacturer makes more profits with an unconstrained co-
operative advertising (ΠNCm > Π
C
m), but also due to the fact that the total channel
profits can be higher. Therefore the manufacturer has the opportunity to make an
unconstrained cooperative advertising program mutually beneficial with the retailer
by sharing the cooperative advertising surplus. Examples of such incentives include
price promotional activities targeted at retailers and various advertising support ser-
vices offered to retailers. For example, Mitsubishi Motors’ cooperative advertising
program is not limited to sharing dealers’ advertising costs as per the participation
rate, it also includes an online advertising planner, which allows dealers to create
their own ads without having to hire an advertising agency and to use pre-prepared
layouts and creative copies (Jackson 2004). The use of this type of practices is in-
creasing because the status quo is not a reasonable alternative for manufacturers in
many industries.
6 Conclusion
Cooperative advertising programs are commonly offered by manufacturers to their
retailers and generally contain two major components: a participation rate that
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specifies the percentage of retailer advertising that a manufacturer is committed to
pay and an accrual rate that specifies the maximum manufacturer’s contribution to
the cooperative advertising program as a percentage of the retailer’s purchases from
the manufacturer. This paper investigates in a bilateral monopoly context how the
use of an accrual constraint in a cooperative advertising program affects channel
members’ profits, as well as their pricing and advertising equilibrium decisions.
The main findings of this inquiry are as follows. Compared to the unconstrained
cooperative advertising programs used in the literature, when an accrual constraint
is included in the program and the accrual constraint is activated, meaning that the
manufacturer’s contribution to the retailer’s advertising costs exceeds the accrued
cooperative advertising budget, both the manufacturer and retailer reduce their ad-
vertising efforts to the level where cooperative advertising is not offered. The retailer
also reduces the retail price to the level where cooperative advertising is not offered,
while the manufacturer reduces the wholesale price, but keeps it higher compared to
when cooperative advertising is not offered. These strategic moves translate to less
(more) profits for the manufacturer (retailer).
The findings of this research show that pricing and advertising strategies rec-
ommended in the current cooperative advertising literature, which has mainly in-
vestigated unconstrained cooperative advertising programs (Aust and Buscher 2014;
Jørgensen and Zaccour 2014), may not be optimal when manufacturers set limits to
their cooperative advertising budgets based on retailers’ accrued purchases. Particu-
larly, when the accrued budget prevents manufacturers from supporting the full share
of the retailer’s advertising costs based on the participation rates, the retailer reverts
to the status quo and maintains her pricing and advertising strategies of the game
without cooperative advertising. The manufacturer slightly increases his wholesale
price compared to when cooperative advertising is not offered, but this increase is not
enough to stimulate more advertising investments. In such a context, the accrued
cooperative advertising fund is mostly used as a side payment to compensate the
retailer for smaller margins than an incentive to stimulate retailer advertising.
Compared to Zhang et al. (2015) who also study the use of accrual constraints,
the current research shows that pricing decisions are key to understanding how chan-
nel members deal with accrual constraints in cooperative advertising programs. It
therefore stresses the importance of studying the interplay between pricing and coop-
erative advertising decisions as advocated in previous works (Jørgensen and Zaccour
2014; Yan 2010). Unless the accrual constraint is not restrictive, i.e., it does not pre-
vent the retailer from reaching her optimal advertising investments based exclusively
on the participation rate, the inclusion of an accrual rate in a cooperative advertising
program is counterproductive and should be avoid by manufacturers. As we already
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know, as long as they are designed to align the interests of all channel members,
unconstrained cooperative advertising programs give incentive to all parties involved
to invest more in advertising and generate more profits that can be shared in various
ways, including side payments and additional advertising support services.
Finally, there are several possible extensions of this work. Examples include the
addition of long-term effects of advertising and competition either at the retail or
manufacturing level.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Appendix A: Equilibrium solutions for the scenario with
no cooperative advertising (NCA game)
When there is no accrual constraint in the problem, the objective function for the
retailer ismaxp,er Πr = maxp,er [(p−w)d−e
2








To get a semi negative definite Hessian, the second-order conditions for the retailer
are then:
−2 < 0,
4− g2 > 0.
The first condition is always satisfied and the second condition is satisfied for g2 < 4,
which is also always true for g ∈ (0, 1) as per our model set-up. We then proceed
to solving the retailer’s problem. Solving the first-order conditions, we obtain the
retailer’s reaction functions which are given by:
p =
g2w − 2 bem − 2A− 2w
(g − 2) (g + 2)
,
er = −
g (bem + A− w)
(g − 2) (g + 2)
.
We then replace the retail price and retail advertising by the obtained expressions
above in the manufacturer’s profit function and solve the manufacturer’s problem
given by maxw,em Πm = maxw,em [wd − e
2















The second-order conditions for the manufacturer are
g2 − 4 < 0,
b2 + 2g2 − 8 < 0.
Again, for g, b ∈ (0, 1), both the first and the second conditions are true. We
then solve the first-order conditions of the manufacturer’s problem to get the equi-
librium manufacturer’s wholesale price and advertising strategies. The results are as
following:
w =
A (g − 2) (g + 2)




b2 + 2 g2 − 8
.
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Now, we substitute the obtained equilibrium expressions of w and em into the
retailer’s reaction functions previously obtained, and get the equilibrium solution for
the basic problem without any cooperative advertising such as
p =
A (g2 − 6)




(b2 + 2g2 − 8)
,
Πr =
−A2 (g − 2) (g + 2)








b2 + 2 g2 − 8
.
In the paper, these strategies are denoted by the superscript NCA. For A > 0,
g, b ∈ (0, 1) we verify that the following conditions are satisfied at the equilibrium:
the retailer’s pricing, advertising effort and profit are positive and the retail price is
higher than the wholesale price to guarantee positive retail margins. We also verify
that the manufacturer’s wholesale price, advertising effort and profit are positive.
Finally, we verify that the demand is positive. As previously stated, the second-order
conditions for all problems are also verified for the parameters’ ranges specified in
the model.
7.2 Appendix B: Equilibrium solution for the scenario with
cooperative advertising and no accrual constraint (NC
game)
In this case, the manufacturer reimburses a percentage η ∈ (0, 1) of the retailer’s
advertising cost. We solve for the equilibrium solution by backward induction and
start by the retailer’s problem. The latter is given by maxp,er Πr = maxp,er [(p−w)d−
(1− η) e2r ]. Given the retailer’s profit function in this scenario, the Hessian matrix
of the optimization problem (with respect to retailer’s price and advertising cost for
the manufacturer, i.e., p, er) is as following:

−2 g




To ensure a semi negative definite Hessian, the second-order conditions for the
retailer are then:
−2 < 0,
4 (1− η)− g2 > 0.




).We then proceed to solving the retailer’s problem and discuss the feasibility of
the second condition later at the point of optimal η. Solving the first-order conditions
of the retailer’s problem, we obtain the retailer’s reaction functions which are given
by:
p =
(2 bem + 2A+ 2w) η + g
2w − 2 bem − 2A− 2w




g2 + 4 η − 4
.
Next, we replace the retailer’s price and advertising by the obtained expressions in
the manufacturer’s profit functions and solve the manufacturer’s problem given by
























b2 + 2g2 − 8

< 0,
f (em, η, w) < 0.
where f (em, η, w) is a polynomial of degree 2 and is too long to include here. We
discuss the validity of these conditions at the point of optimal η later in this sec-
tion. We solve the first-order conditions of the manufacturer’s problem to get the
equilibrium manufacturer’s wholesale price and advertising effort. The results are as
follows:
w =
A (3 g2 − 16)











Next, we substitute w, η and em into the retailer’s reaction functions, and obtain
the equilibrium solution for the unconstrained problem such as
p =
3 (g2 − 8)A




4 b2 + 9 g2 − 32
,
Πr =
−8A2 (3 g2 − 8)




4 b2 + 9 g2 − 32
.
In the paper, these strategies are denoted by the superscript NC.For A > 0,
g, b ∈ (0, 1) we verify that the following conditions are satisfied at the equilibrium:
the retailer’s pricing, advertising effort and profit are positive and the retail price is
higher than the wholesale price to guarantee positive retail margins. We also verify
that the manufacturer’s wholesale price, advertising effort and profit are positive and
that the coop advertising rate (η) is between 0 and 1. Finally, we verify that the
demand is positive at the equilibrium. The second-order conditions for the retailer’s
problem are verified iff g2 + 4η − 4 < 0. Therefore, at the equilibrium (η = 1
3
), this
condition is satisfied for any g ∈ (0, 1). Similarly, all second-order conditions for the
manufacturer’s problem are always verified at the equilibrium for g, b ∈ (0, 1) .
7.3 Appendix C: Equilibrium solution for the scenario with
cooperative advertising and the accrual constraint (C
game)
When an accrual constraint (AC) is employed by the manufacturer a part of the
cooperative advertising program, two scenarios can occur. Given a specific accrual
rate r, when the accrual constraint is satisfied, i.e., rwd − ηe2r ≥ 0, the channel
members will choose the equilibrium solution for the NCA game. Replacing w,d, η
and er by their equilibrium expressions in the NC game (rwNCdNC−ηNC(eNCr )
2 ≥ 0),






A representation of this constraint is shown in Figure A.1. For a specific value
of the parameter g, the accrual constraint represented by the curve in Figure 1 is
satisfied iff the accrual rate (r) is higher than the corresponding value on the curve.
Therefore, in the area above the curve, the manufacturer and the retailer will choose
the equilibrium in the NC game. However, in the area below the curve, i.e., for
lower values of the accrual rate (r), the equilibrium for the NC game cannot be
implemented. Instead of paying an amount of ηe2r to the retailer, the manufacturer
pays only an amount corresponding to rwd. We need then to solve the retailer’s and
the manufacturer’s problems to find the equilibrium solution for values of r and g
that are below the curve in Figure A.1.









Figure A.1. The accrual constraint




problem is maxp,er Πr = maxp,er [(p−w)d−e
2
r+ rwd]. The Hessian matrix associated






The second-order conditions for the retailer are:
−2 < 0,
4− g2 > 0.
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Both of these constraints are satisfied for g ∈ (0, 1). We then proceed to solving
the retailer’s problem by solve the first-order conditions to get the retailer’s reaction
functions:
p =
− (g2 − 2) (r − 1)w − 2 bem − 2A
(g − 2) (g + 2)
,
er =
−g ((r − 1)w + bem +A)
(g − 2) (g + 2)
.
The manufacturer’s problem in this scenarios is given bymaxw,em Πm = maxw,em [wd−
e2m − rwd]. We plug the retailer’s reaction functions into the manufacturer’s profit
and get the following expression
Πm =
2w (r − 1) (A+ bem) + e
2
m (4− g
2) + 2w2 (1− r)2
(g − 2) (g + 2)
.














The second-order conditions for the manufacturer are then
4 (r − 1)2
(g − 2) (g + 2)
< 0,
−4 (r − 1)2 (b2 + 2 g2 − 8)
(g − 2)2 (g + 2)2
> 0.
Both of these conditions are always verified for any g, b, r ∈ (0, 1).
Next, solving the first-order conditions for the manufacturer’s problem, we get
the following results:
w =
A (g − 2) (g + 2)




(b2 + 2g2 − 8)
.
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Next, we plug the obtained w and em into the retailer’s reaction functions and
obtain the following equilibrium solution:
p =
A (g2 − 6)








b2 + 2 g2 − 8
,
Πr =
− (g − 2) (g + 2)A2
(b2 + 2 g2 − 8)2
,
Πch =
−A2 (b2 + 3 g2 − 12)
(b2 + 2 g2 − 8)2
,
p− w =
A (g2r − 6 r + 2)
(b2 + 2 g2 − 8) (r − 1)
.
In the paper, these strategies are denoted by the superscript C. For any A > 0,
g, b, r ∈ (0, 1) we verify that the following conditions are satisfied at the equilibrium:
the retailer’s pricing, advertising effort and profit are positive and the retail price is
higher than the wholesale price to guarantee positive retail margins. We also verify
that the manufacturer’s wholesale price, advertising effort and profit are positive.
Finally, we verify that the demand is positive at the equilibrium and that second
order conditions for all games are true.
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